This paper examines the relationship between common stock return and corporate cultural behaviour of twenty listed firms from Shanghai Stock Exchange. The particular research questions of this study include: whether corporate cultural behaviour impacts common stock returns and under what conditions it impacts shareholder expectations and corporate governance. Keywords: corporate cultural behaviour, mood state, stock return, shareholder wealth, weather.
Introduction
The principle financial objective of a firm is to maximize the wealth of its common stockholders. In this exercise, allocation of organizational resources among business functions (e.g., marketing, operations) is a critical decision as it affects the business strategy of the firm. In order to maximize the wealth of common stockholders, managers must ensure that the organizational resources are allocated efficiently and effectively among business functions as overall rate of return to ordinary shareholders is determined by the aggregate sum of earnings generated by the business. Each function of an organization is governed by a set of values of the organization. A quantitative assessment and consideration of business values (business cultural values) on financial objectives is extremely important. On the other hand, the value system of a business has an impact on the business strategy and ultimately the performance of the organization.
D. Ravasi and M. Schultz (2006) identify organizational culture as a set of shared mental assumptions that guide interpretation and action in organizations by defining appropriate behaviour for various situations. It is a unique behaviour of members accepted within the organization in achieving the corporate strategy. It is therefore apparent from contemporary thoughts that the corporate culture is about how the members of the organization influence the business strategy and the value system governing the conduct of business towards achieving the business (corporate) strategy. The behaviour of members within the organization is therefore a deterministic element of the value (or strategic corporate worth) of business. The literature recognizes the behaviour of organizational members as a salient feature of the corporate culture (see e.g., Kotter 1992; Kotter Corporate culture plays an important role in financial management. Abdul Rashid et al. (2003) examine the influence of corporate culture and organizational commitment on financial performance in Malaysian firms and find that the corporate culture is significantly related to the organizational commitment and corporate performance. They also find that the organizational commitment has an influence on the financial performance. K. Kant (2017) carries out a survey on the relationship between corporate strategy and profitability of 96 firms from various sectors with different sizes. The respondents of the firms in the sample consist of top management executives such as chief executive officers, managing directors, directors. The study finds that the firms whose culture aligned with business (corporate strategy) strategy tend to report higher profitability than that of firms whose culture is not aligned with corporate strategy which report lower profitability. He It is however assumed that these values are not aligned with agents' own objectives and there is no agency problem (i.e. conflict of interest between agents and the equity holders) in the firms under consideration. Behaviour of agents collectively determines the results of the organization. The line two views the process from financial management perspective whereas line one views such from general management perspective.
The profitability determines the ultimate value of the firm as retained earnings are carried forward in reserves for equity holders. Eventually, the profitability determines the ultimate value of the stake of common stocks and the profitability is achieved through the direct actions of members of the organization which reflect the perceived behaviour. On the other hand, the theories of market efficiency suggest that the human behaviour is not a deterministic function of shareholder wealth (See e.g., Fama, 1965 ). E. de Jong and R. Semenov (2002) demonstrate that cultural elements such as uncertainty avoidance and higher levels of masculinity have an impact on equity market development whereas C. W. Senarathne et al. (2017) examine the relationship between national cultural dimension, collectivism-individualism and the stock market return of ten well established stock exchanges of the world and find no sufficient evidence to generalize the existence of such relationship in the stock markets. The linkage between stock return and corporate culture when human behaviour is governed by a firm-specific value system is not broadly documented in the literature. However, a number of scholars such as R. Comment Popadak (2015) finds that the corporate culture is an important element through which the shareholder governance affects the firm value because shareholder governance is associated corporate culture. It is therefore plausible to surmise that corporate cultural behaviour may influence the shareholder return when firms do not align their culture with corporate financial objectives. Note that the priority is given to strategies that are directly related to shareholder wealth maximization principle.
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between common stock return and corporate cultural behaviour of randomly selected twenty listed firms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The particular research questions of this study include; whether the corporate cultural behaviour impacts common stock returns and under what conditions it impacts shareholder expectations and corporate governance. The tasks and research methods include computing the value of variable , which reflects the corporate cultural behaviour, according to the conceptual framework and applying Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression technique to determine the impact of corporate cultural behaviour on common stock return. Further, Binary Logistic Regression technique is used to understand the reasonableness of the role of temperature in the computations and final regressions. The results show that the corporate actions derived from corporate cultural behaviour do not impact stock return when firms do not align their operations with direct interest of shareholders and common stockholders tend to claim a premium when their expectations are not met by the firms in the course of business operation.
Section two provides the methodological framework for the study and section three discusses the findings, along with sample selection and descriptions of data. Section four provides concluding remarks.
Methodological framework
In order to identify the relationship between return of equity holders and corporate culture, one must assign a numerical measure for corporate cultural behaviour. A number of scholars in the finance literature consider weather variables such as temperature, rain, sunshine as quantitative measures of mood (see e.g., Saunders 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003; Keef and Roush, 2007) Each operational event of a firm results in change in wealth of equity holders which will theoretically be the change in the market price (cum dividend) of the firm. Assume that the book value per share of firm i at time t ( it V ) is equal to the market value (price) it P of firm i at time t because the firm's stock is trading in a market which largely converges to a Tobin's (1984) or Roll's (1988) version of efficiency. Each operational event is associated with human behaviour of 'people' within the firm which is observed by the operational time of the market (i.e. the trading event) such that a new equilibrium market price is determined. The return it r attributable to equity of firm i at time t becomes where m r is the return on market portfolio at time t and t ε is payoffs attributable (stochastic noise) to equity holders on firm-specific information events (i.e. human operation) observed at each operational time t in the market and 0 m mt r β β + is the mean (let it also be denoted as µ ) of return conditional on information set I available to investors at time t (note that payoffs t ε is under direct control of the individual firms). On the assumption of classical Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression for homoscedasticity of residuals, ( | ) 0
Since the market is assumed to be efficient, ( | ) 0 t t E n ε ≥ where t n is the operation n at time t . Also, at each operation directed by observation n at time t , ( ) Clark, 1973; Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990 ; Senarathne and Jianguo, 2017; Senarathne and Jayasinghe, 2017; Senarathne and Long, 2018 for a complete exposition). The market is assumed to be efficient so that the expectation of price changes conditional on firm-specific information events or corporate actions n observed at each operational time, ( | ) 0
because the equity holders receive nothing from the market expectation (stock price changes are assumed to be completely random and determined only by the number of firm-specific new information arrival at the market on every corporate action) as price increments
ε and an increasing function of t (see Clark, 1973, p. 139) .
Temperature is used as the numerical proxy for mood state that acts as a mediator between human behaviour and weather on the assumption that the organizational culture is influenced by the mood state of human resources or 'people' of the organization. On the other hand, scholars demonstrate that the national culture influences employee behaviour in a work setting (see Schneider, 1988; Smith et al., 1996; Lok and Crawford, 2004) and their individual behaviour in general (see especially Schuler and Rogovsky, 1998) . It is however assumed that individual differences of 'people' within the organization do not affect the corporate culture. The general behaviour of 'people' induced by mood states becomes a corporate cultural behaviour when 'people' , as human resource, are attached to a particular organizational setting surrounded by a value system unique to the particular organization. When 'people' become human resource of an organization, a unique behaviour is formed within the organization that distinguishes from the general behaviour of 'people' (when they are outside the organization). A good example to explain behavioural change with respect to this phenomenon is that, consider an unconstrained and constrained mind when a person before and after seeing the notice of 'CCTV camera in operation' in the circumstances. Organizations develop their own values and culture within the particular work setting (see Hofstede, 1985; 1994; 2001) . In some sense, 'people' suppress their real behaviour when they are attached to a particular work setting, governed by a unique value system. J. M. George and G. R. Jones (1996) specifically argue that the mood of employee is a critical determinant of behaviour. Mood fluctuates over time and the changes in mood state determine the particular culture at work. This is further testified by the work of Rest (1986) who suggests that mood may cause organization-wide consequences at the individuals' anticipation and business decision making process.
Human behaviour is part and parcel of the business operation, leading to achieving the ultimate objective of maximizing the value of business. Therefore, the employee behaviour is a determinant of the ultimate outcome of business process (i.e., value of firm). Corporate culture could ultimately be formed by the value attributable to corporate behaviour as a whole. Each operational event of an organization is driven by a particular behaviour of its 'people' which is observed by each trade of the firm's equity at the market and each trade results in a new equilibrium price determined in the market. Let i C be the corporate cultural behavior of firm i and b denotes the general behavior (when 'people' are not constrained by an organizational specific value system) mediated by mood state. At each operational event of the firm associated with corporate cultural behaviour (firm-specific) is observed by n number of observations (note that the firm-specific information is available to equity holders at each observation of corporate cultural behaviour) at operational time t which results in t ε amount of payoffs attributable to equity holders.
Such that where δ j is the jth intraday price increment at time t which is summed up over a monthly data horizon (see Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) p. 222 for a similar preposition). With time subscript (operational time), equation 2 can be written as (a similar preposition is adopted in Ajzen, 1991) . The logic of obtaining fitted residuals from the equation regressing return on market return rather than regressing market price on index value is that the price change, for example, from The coefficient estimates may however be subject to significant variation in metrological phenomenon of cities. Although the temperature is a medically testified proxy variable for mood state (see especially Keller et al., 2005) , one must establish the fact that the sign of the coefficients truly represents the relationship between human behaviour and stock return. Consider the following specification, 
where 4 β is the estimate from the logit regression and t υ is the error term which is assumed to be well behaved. The corresponding probability ( ) p of the estimate at unity (a variable) is given by, ( ) 
In order to ensure that the equation (3) is specified in this respect, the following logit regression model is employed where the parameters are estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML) method.
( ) (3) is specified as per the conceptual model (see Table 2 for estimated probabilities).
Data and findings Data
Twenty listed firms are selected from the firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange on a random sampling basis. Type A shares (where only local counterparts are allowed to trade) are given high priority in the sample selection (the sample includes type A-shares) in order to ensure the reflection of country specific human behavioural factors in line with the conceptual framework. Returns are generated for a sampling period of 19 Table 1 .
Empirical findings
Except for firm 9, 17 and 20 whose unconditional returns are normally distributed, unconditional distributions of return and the variable computed for corporate cultural behavior ( C ) are clearly nonnormal as JB test statistic exceeds its critical value of 5.99 at 5% statistical significance level. Statistical properties such as skewness and kurtosis of return and C exist for firms violating normality assumption. The minimum value of C is less than zero and maximum value is positive for all firms, justifying sufficient variations in weather conditions under four seasons namely summer, winter, spring and autumn. China provides a good support for the conceptual framework given the significant variation in the weather (i.e., temperature) over the four seasons (see Zhang et al., 2017) . Except for firm 8, the null hypothesis for return and C having unit root under ADF test is rejected for all firms as the test statistic falls below the critical value of -2.87 at 5% significance level. However, variable C of firm 8 is subject to a unit root as the test statistic remains at -1.919. Regression for each firm covers a good number of observations to invoke the law of large numbers (i.e., central limit theorem). The distributions of temperature and rain data are highly nonnormal and shown to have unit roots as null hypothesis of ADF is accepted at 5% significance level.
As Table 2 outlines, beta coefficients of 19 firms are highly statistically significant at 5% significance level. Coefficient 1 β that measures the magnitude of changes in stock return in response to corporate cultural behavior becomes negative and statistically significant for 4 firms (2 firms at 5% significance level and 2 firm at 10% significance level) rejecting the null hypothesis of the study. More importantly, the coefficient 1 β is negative for 15 firms in the sample which establishes the expected relationship between corporate cultural behavior and common stock return. The significance depends on the extent to which the firms align their corporate actions (or cultural behaviour) with the expectations of shareholders. As Table  4 shows, the total and the average Standardized Dividend Yield (SDY) (reflects the basic idea of Treynor (1965) ) of 3 firms whose coefficient 1 β becomes significantly negative are substantially higher than the total and the average SDY of 15 firms whose 1 β is not statistically significant and negative. These results imply that the corporate cultural behavior impacts stock returns only when the corporate actions are directed towards shareholder wealth maximization. When corporate actions do not lead to compensate its shareholders (or the corporate culture is not aligned with shareholder wealth maximization principle), the attention of equity investors (traders) is not drawn to firm-specific operational events/segments and, as such, the corporate cultural behaviour does not impact stock returns of such firms. The coefficient of temperature ( 2 β ) is negative and statistically significant for only one firm and none of the coefficients of rain ( 3 β ) is negative and statistically significant in the model specification (03).
Alignment of corporate culture (corporate actions) with shareholder wealth maximization principle could be measured, for instance, by the extent to which the firm compensates its equity holders in the form of dividends. The number of times or the average divided distribution during the sampling period does not indicate the true equity compensation because the equity investors are exposed to market risk at different degrees of operations of each firm which is beyond their direct control. Firms' managers need to pay attention to this aspect in order to manage shareholder risk as a practice of good governance. The firms' operations critically impact the extent to which the equity holders could reduce their exposures to systemic risk by appropriately diversifying the stock portfolios. As such, the equity compensation should be estimated with reference to systematic risk of the security (or firm) in question.
Shareholders are more concerned about their stake and whether the firm aligns the corporate culture (corporate actions) with shareholder wealth maximization principle, for example, adequately diversifying the business portfolio in order to eliminate the excessive risk and provides a decent return to stock holders, commensurate with the market risk. As such, these firms do not provide sufficient amount of payoffs for equity holders by taking appropriate corporate actions in managing the funds invested in the firms' equity capital.
The coefficient 6 β under logit regression is negative for 19 firms in the sample. This confirms that the temperature negatively impacts the likelihood of occurrence of positive returns. Coefficient 6 β of 10 firms is statistically significant at varying significance levels (4 firms at 5% significance level, 4 firms at 10% significance level and 2 firms at 15% significance level). The corresponding estimated probabilities of observing positive return under the specification (4) or (6) are reported in Table 2 . The recorded probability is 55% on average (20 firms).
As compensation details provided in Table 4 , stocks of firms whose 1 β becomes negative and statistically significant do not demand a greater premium for systematic risk (0.63) when compared with the stockholders of other firms whose 1 β is not statistically significant (0.95). Note that the risk premium claimed on financial leverage is assumed to be zero. Meeting shareholder expectations in terms of firms-specific (corporate) actions (for example, investment in a positive net present value investment project in order to increase Return on Equity (ROE)) is expected to be weaker in these firms as shareholder returns are determined largely by the information segments or events that are beyond the direct control of individual firms (e.g. economic and political factors). As such, trading on these information variables, without sufficient payoffs accruing from individual firm-specific events or corporate actions, requires shareholders to demand an additional risk premium (see the comparison made in Table 4 ).
Conclusion
E. M. Saunders (1993) and many others have shown that the human behaviour determines the magnitude of price changes. Primarily, this proposition has been defended in the literature considering mood state of individual investors altered by weather variables, although it is soundly rejected in some instances (see especially Krämer and Runde, 1997) . When 'people' are attached to a particular work setting, a specific behaviour is formed which distinguishes from the behaviour of 'people' when they are not constrained by a corporate specific value system. As such, it is highly likely that the corporate specific behaviour may impact the return of equity holders. The regression of common stock returns on the numerical variable computed for corporate cultural behaviour produces statistically significant negative coefficients for only three firms whose corporate actions, derived from corporate specific behaviour, are directed towards shareholder wealth maximization. As such, the corporate cultural behaviour does not impact stock returns when firms do not align their operations with the interest of shareholders. The results also reveal that, when the firms pay less attention (by way of equity compensation) to its shareholders in the course of operation, the corporate culture does not impact the return required by the ordinary shareholders as their trading is not justified by operational information segments or events under direct control of the organizations. Rather, the equities are traded largely on the information segments or events that are beyond the direct control of individual firms (e.g., economic and political factors).
The appropriateness of temperature as a proxy variable for mood state of individual investors has been testified by the sign of logit regression coefficients. The results also reveal that the mood proxied by temperature has a negative impact on the likelihood of observing positive returns and the estimated probabilities are above average. Premium for market risk as measured by the systematic risk of individual firms is substantially high, when the firms do not compensate (as measured by SDY) equity holders commensurate with the market risk. These findings suggest that the organizational culture plays a key role in shareholder risk management under corporate governance. Therefore, the managers should listen to the market and understand the behaviour of price change process of common stocks as a part of their exercise of corporate governance.
